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Abstract  
 
Purpose – When a service fails, the guarantee policy of the firm can be employed as a 
recovery strategy.  The terms of the guarantee determine the amount of payout and the ease 
of invoking the policy.  The guarantee terms can, therefore, influence customer perceptions of 
recovery fairness and inferences about the firm’s intentions in providing fair recovery.  The 
study examines the impact of guarantee terms on customer perceptions of justice, motive 
attributions and repatronage intentions. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – A between-subjects experiment was conducted in parcel 
delivery services.  
 
Findings – Customer perceptions of justice vary across guarantee payout levels.  Payout in 
the form of a discount does not restore justice perceptions, and leads to inferences that the 
firm offered the guarantee to maximise its profits.  Conversely, full refund restores justice.  
Full refund plus discount is perceived as undeserved, and does not enhance justice 
perceptions.  A moderately easy-to-invoke guarantee is perceived as fair, when it includes 
full refund.  Inferences of negative firm’s motives, however, diminish perceived fairness of 
easy-to-invoke guarantees. 
 
Research limitations/implications – Future research could examine the interaction of 
guarantee scope with payout and ease of invocation, and how types of motives differentially 
impact justice perceptions.  
 
Practical implications – Full refund can enhance justice perceptions, whereas discount is 
perceived as unfair.  Firms should offer full refund as guarantee payout, but refrain from 
offering a discount.  Flexibility should be embedded in guarantee invocation procedures. 
 
Originality/value – This study demonstrates that service guarantees employed as recovery 
strategies signal justice and the firm’s motives.  
 
Keywords: Service recovery, Guarantee, Justice, Signaling theory, Inferred motive  
Article Classification: Research paper 
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1. Introduction  
The delivery of fair service recovery is crucial for restoring customer satisfaction and 
for encouraging repatronage following a service failure.  Fair service recovery can be 
provided through organisational efforts, such as a compensation that offsets costs incurred by 
the customer, a timely resolution of the failure, and polite interpersonal treatment (e.g., 
Blodgett et al., 1997; Roschk and Kaiser, 2013; Smith et al., 1999; Tax et al., 1998).  
Although employees are instrumental in delivering recovery, organisational policies such as 
service guarantees, can pose a constraint to employee efforts and, in turn, influence customer 
perceptions of recovery fairness.  For example, a customer may perceive recovery as unfair if 
the compensation for a delivery lost in the post does not at least cover for the cost of the 
service, or it is lower than the level set in the policy.   
Service guarantees are frequently used by companies across sectors, such as 
hospitality, banking and professional services (e.g., Co-operative Bank’s guarantee on 
customer service, Royal Mail’s guarantee on delivery services).  The prevalence of service 
guarantees has spurred conceptual and empirical studies examining the characteristics of 
service guarantees and the impact of these policies on consumer perceptions and behaviour.  
In this regard, Hart (1988) proposed the precepts of service guarantee policies, whilst Ostrom 
and Iacobucci (1998) investigated the role of service guarantees in shaping customer 
satisfaction and quality perceptions.  Following on the above studies, several other issues 
relating to service guarantees have been examined, for instance, the influence of guarantees 
on customer preferences (McDougall et al., 1998) and perceptions of risk (Wirtz and Kum, 
2001; Wirtz et al., 2000), service guarantee as a signaling mechanism (McCollough and 
Gremler, 2004), the impact of guarantees on customer cheating intentions (Wirtz and Kum, 
2004), customer choice of the service provider (Wu et al., 2012), and purchase decisions (Jin 
and He, 2013).  Despite the above advances, little empirical research has addressed how a 
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service guarantee functions in a recovery context, and the impact of this policy on customer 
perceptions of recovery fairness.   
The abovementioned paucity of research is surprising, given that guarantee policies 
are often invoked when a service fails.  Moreover, designing and employing service 
guarantees is crucial for effective service management, especially in a recovery context.  This 
viewpoint is shared by a number of researchers who contend that service guarantees represent 
an important, yet underestimated, recovery method, and call for research investigating the 
role of service guarantees in a recovery context (e.g., Berman and Mathur, 2014; Björlin-
Lidén and Edvardsson, 2003; Björlin-Lidén and Skålén, 2003; Callan and Moore, 1998; 
Hogreve and Gremler, 2009).  In a conceptual study, Kandampully and Butler (2001) suggest 
that recovery implemented through service guarantees can reduce negative word of mouth.  
Further, Björlin-Lidén and Edvardsson (2003) and Björlin-Lidén and Skålén (2003) note that 
customers are concerned about the fairness of service guarantees and are suspicious of 
guarantee policies introduced in an effort to increase customer acquisition rates.  However, 
the above studies do not examine customer perceptions of fairness and inferences about the 
firm’s motives for introducing this guarantee, when this policy is implemented as a recovery 
strategy.   
In a recent study, Van Vaerenberg et al. (2014) investigate how employee recovery 
efforts shape customer intentions towards invoking service guarantees.  In the above study, 
service recovery and guarantees are treated as two distinct strategies and customer 
perceptions of justice are not examined.  McQuilken et al. (2013), on the other hand, consider 
customer perceptions of justice related to the payout set in guarantee policies and employee 
behaviour, however the study does not account for customers’ perceived justice towards the 
guarantee invocation processes.  Along with guarantee payout, the invocation process 
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represents an important dimension of the service guarantee policy, as pointed out by Hart 
(1988), and more recently by Berman and Mathur (2014).   
In practice, through service guarantees, a company pledges compensation and lays 
down the procedures for claiming the compensation in the event of service failure (i.e. 
guarantee terms).  These two guarantee terms, in turn, signal the firm’s fairness in attempting 
recovery, and the firm’s intentions for offering the policy.  The signaling effect of guarantee 
terms can be seen as consistent with the well-established Signaling Theory (Spence, 1973, 
1974, 2002).  Prior research suggests that, in their role of signals, service guarantees convey 
information about the quality attributes of the service (e.g., Chen et al., 2009; Wirtz and 
Kum, 2001; Wirtz et al., 2000) and the firm’s intentions (e.g., McCollough and Gremler, 
1999).  The effects of service guarantees as signals of justice in a service recovery context, 
however, have not yet been examined.  
Further, customers evaluate the information signaled by the guarantee terms, and they 
draw inferences about the firm’s motives for offering the policy.  For example, Kukar-Kinney 
et al. (2007) suggest that customers infer the firm’s motives from the specific terms set in the 
policy, which in turn influence justice perceptions.  Such inferences represent attributions for 
the intentions or motives underlying the firm’s actions, termed ‘inferred motive’ (Campbell, 
1999).  Based on the valence of inferred motives (positive or negative), customers form 
perceptions as to whether the guarantee terms are fair or unfair.  For instance, when receiving 
small guarantee payout in the form of a discount rather than full refund, customers may view 
the firm as pursuing its own interests of profits (negative motive), rather than serving the 
customer interests (positive motive).  In such instances, customers may feel treated unfairly. 
Perceptions of unfairness may in turn lower intentions to repatronize the firm.  Extant service 
recovery research has so far overlooked inferred motive, despite the relevance of this 
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attribution in explaining customers’ cognitive processes of evaluating guarantee policies and 
concurring justice perceptions.   
Seeking to address the above research gaps, this study investigates customer 
perceptions of justice and inferences of motive when service guarantees are employed as 
recovery strategies.  The study sets two objectives, a) to examine how two widely-practised 
terms of service guarantees, namely guarantee payout (the policy compensation) and the ease 
of the policy invocation process (ease of invocation), signal justice rendered by the firm in 
handling service failures and the firm’s motives, and b) to investigate how customer 
inferences of motive contribute to explaining customer perceptions of justice and consequent 
repatronage intentions. 
The present study offers important contributions to theory.  The findings demonstrate 
that service guarantees can be employed as recovery strategies.  Specifically, the terms of 
these policies signal the firm’s fairness and trigger customer inferences about the firm’s 
motives (i.e. inferred motive).  The concept of inferred motive helps in explaining the 
cognitive process underlying customer evaluation of service guarantees and the formation of 
justice perceptions in a recovery context.  Notably, the study establishes that the interface 
between justice, signaling and attribution theories provides a useful theoretical framework for 
understanding customer perceptions of fairness when service guarantees are employed as 
recovery strategies.  The findings offer practical implications on how to design optimal 
service guarantees, and how to leverage these policies as signals of fairness and of the firm’s 
motives in a recovery context. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Perceptions of justice in service recovery 
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The concept of justice (or fairness) has long been studied in the fields of social 
psychology and sociology.  In social psychology, the Justice Theory was first espoused by 
Homans (1961).  Here, justice is defined as an evaluative judgment of a person’s treatment, 
which is perceived to be fair or just when ‘it corresponds to some standard or criterion of 
what is morally right’ (Furby, 1986, p.153).  In services research, scholars concur on the 
relevance of perceived justice in explaining customer evaluations of recovery efforts 
delivered by employees (e.g., Chebat and Slusarczyk, 2005; Choi and Choi, 2014; del Río-
Lanza et al., 2009; Schoefer and Diamantopoulos, 2008; Smith et al., 1999; Tax et al., 1998).  
In this domain, justice is conceptualised as consisting of three dimensions – distributive, 
procedural and interactional. 
Distributive justice is explained by social exchange and equity theories (Adams, 1965; 
Blau, 1964), and it entails perceptions of receiving fairly allocated resources or outcomes.  In 
a recovery context, customers perceive distributive justice when the benefits resulting from 
recovery outcomes (e.g., refund, discount, apology) outweigh the sacrifices  incurred by the 
customer (e.g., time and effort of lodging a complaint).  Procedural justice relates to 
perceptions that the processes followed in delivering outcomes are fair (Thibaut and Walker, 
1975).  In a recovery context, procedural justice results when recovery processes are timely 
(Karatepe, 2006) and flexible (del Río-Lanza et al., 2009).  Interactional justice entails 
perceptions that the manner in which outcomes are communicated is fair (Bies and Moag, 
1986).  Customers perceive interactional justice when service employees show politeness and 
empathy (e.g., Maxham and Netemeyer 2002; Smith et al., 1999), appear concerned about the 
service failure and make efforts towards addressing the inconvenience caused (e.g., Homburg 
and Fürst 2005; Karatepe 2006). 
This study focuses on distributive and procedural justice.  In particular, the study 
examines two guarantee terms –  payout and ease of invocation (hereafter EoI).  Payout 
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entails the compensation set in the guarantee, and EoI relates to the procedures of invoking 
the guarantee.  When guarantees function as recovery strategies, payout size is likely to 
influence perceptions of receiving fair (or unfair) recovery compensation, affirming 
distributive justice.  Further, EoI is likely to influence perceptions that recovery procedures 
are timely, affirming procedural justice.  Given that the manner in which employees interact 
with the customer in a recovery situation is not contingent upon the terms set in the 
guarantee, the dimension of interactional justice is not included in the present study.  
 
2.2 The impact of service guarantee terms on perceived justice 
The impact of service guarantee terms on distributive and procedural justice can be 
explained by signaling theory (Spence, 1973).  A fundamental tenet of signaling theory is 
that, ‘different parties to a transaction often have different amounts of information regarding 
the transaction’ in a condition known as ‘information asymmetry’ (Kirmani and Rao, 2000, 
p. 66).  Conditions of information asymmetry exist in a variety of settings.  For example, the 
seminar paper by Spence (1973) illustrates conditions of information asymmetry between 
employers and job applicants in the context of hiring decisions.  In this context, employers 
often lack information about the productive capabilities of job applicants.  Job applicants, 
therefore, use signaling in order to ease the employer’s hiring decisions.  In the context of 
customer-firm exchanges, conditions of information asymmetry are encountered for instance 
at the time of buying a product, wherein several products are available and differences in the 
quality of the offering are often unobservable.  Through signals, firms  convey the quality 
attributes of products.  Signaling is also highly relevant to service contexts, given that the 
characteristics inherent to services are often unobservable and consumers encounter 
conditions of information asymmetry (Jha et al., 2013). 
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In conditions of information asymmetry, the party holding a greater amount of 
information attempts to create positive impressions on the party lacking information by using 
signals.  Signals represent ‘activities or attributes of individuals in a market which, by design 
or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey information to, other individuals in the market’ 
(Spence, 1974, p. 1).  Extant research shows that service guarantees influence customer 
purchase decisions by means of signaling quality and the firm’s intentions in a variety of 
service contexts, including education (McCollough and Gremler, 1999), hotel (Chen et al., 
2009; McQuilken et al., 2013; Wirtz et al., 2000; Wu et al., 2012), and restaurant (Jin and 
He, 2013).  A summary of key studies on service guarantees is included in Appendix 1. 
The relevance of signaling in shaping customer purchase decisions (pre-consumption 
stage) is well established, as illustrated in the summary of literature.  Concurrently, consensus 
is growing that signaling influences customer repurchase decisions (post-consumption stage) 
(e.g., Dutta et al., 2007; McCollough and Gremler, 2004; San Martin and Camarero, 2005; 
McQuilken et al., 2013).  The present study adopts the perspective that signaling is relevant 
post-purchase, in service failure and recovery contexts.  Signals are relevant following 
service failures, wherein customers face conditions of information asymmetry related to the 
decision to repatronize the firm.  At the recovery stage, service guarantees can facilitate 
customer repurchase decisions by signaling that the firm acts fairly. 
In the role of a signal, service guarantees represent ‘a persuasive message that 
includes both the level of compensation and the process of invoking the guarantee to receive 
the compensation’ (Jin and He, 2013, p. 209).  Signaling research classifies service 
guarantees as a default-contingent signal, by which the firm conveys its commitment to incur 
a monetary loss in the event of default on its claim (e.g., the service turns out to be of poor 
quality) (Kirmani and Rao, 2000).  This signal fulfils two main functions, a) informing 
customers about the quality of the service and about the firm’s intentions, and b) protecting 
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the customer against losses associated with service failures (Dutta et al., 2007).  Both 
functions are relevant to service failure and recovery contexts.  When encountering a service 
failure, customers re-evaluate the information conveyed by the guarantee, and they infer the 
firm’s motives for offering the policy (Dutta et al., 2007).  Customers also use the protection 
communicated by guarantee payout and EoI as reference point in forming perceptions of 
justice.  In the present study, guarantee payout and EoI are hypothesised to influence 
customer perceptions of distributive and procedural justice, as discussed below.   
 
2.3 Guarantee payout  
Guarantee payout involves the monetary compensation included in the service 
guarantee and provided to the customer following a service failure (McDougall et al., 1998).  
From a signaling perspective, guarantee payout indicates the firm’s signaling costs, thus the 
asset or wealth forfeited by the firm as a result of signaling (Ippolito, 1990).  Signals are 
credible when firms incur high costs of signaling (Kirmani and Rao, 2000), as indicated by 
large payout.  Research on price guarantees shows that perceived credibility and fairness of 
these policies increase with the size of refund set as payout (Kukar-Kinney et al., 2007).  The 
above effects are explained by the equity theory (Adams, 1965) suggesting that a social 
exchange is restored at equitable levels when the parties in the exchange receive benefits that 
outweigh their sacrifices (or investments).  
Extending the above evidence to a service guarantee context, the present study posits 
that the size of guarantee payout provided as compensation for the service failure will impact 
customer perceptions of fairness.  Consistent with the above logic from equity theory 
(Adams, 1965), guarantee payout creates distributive justice (fairness) when delivering 
benefits to the customer that outweigh the sacrifices incurred as a result of the service failure 
and of lodging a complaint.  When service failures occur, customers experience and 
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inconvenience and make an effort in lodging a complaint (i.e. perceived sacrifices).  
Guarantee payout in the form of a discount (i.e. low payout) is unlikely to overcome the 
sacrifices initially incurred.  By contrast, a guarantee payout in the form of full refund (i.e. 
medium payout) is likely to offset the effort made by the customer and to restore the 
customer-firm relationship to an equitable level.  Accordingly, it is hypothesised that:  
H1a When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers who 
receive medium guarantee payout will show higher perceptions of distributive justice 
than customers who receive low guarantee payout. 
 
On occasions companies may over-compensate customers.  The literature refers to the 
principles of mental accounting for explaining the effect of overcompensation on consumer 
responses.  According to the mental accounting principles (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), 
consumers interpret the service failure as a ‘loss’ and service recovery as a ‘gain’.  When 
compared with simple compensation, overcompensation provides large gains that fully 
overcome the losses incurred as a result of the service failure.  Overcompensation should, 
therefore, result in more positive outcomes than simple compensation.  Yet, extant research 
shows contrasting findings in the above respect.  Evidence provides support for the 
explanation from equity theory (Adams, 1965), whereby large compensation creates positive 
inequity and concurring feelings of guilt amongst consumers.  
Smith et al. (1999) note that moderate recovery compensation shows a greater effect 
on distributive justice perceptions than high compensation, especially when service failures 
are of low severity.  Further, Noone and Lee (2011) demonstrate that whilst cash-based 
overcompensation is preferred over voucher-based overcompensation, the effect of 
overcompensation on customer repatronage intentions does not surpass the effect of 
compensation alone.  Consistent with the above evidence, Gelbrich and Roschk (2011) note 
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that overcompensation following service failures leads to an increase in overall satisfaction, 
which is still smaller than the effect of simple compensation.  
Whilst research in this area examines customer satisfaction with high recovery 
compensation delivered by initiative of the firm and its employees (e.g., Hocutt et al., 2006; 
None and Lee, 2011; Smith et al., 1999), the role of guarantee payout as a form of 
overcompensation and its impact on customer perceptions of justice has so far been 
overlooked.  Kumar et al. (1997) suggest further research on service guarantees that 
‘investigates important issues such as the determination of the optimum levels of 
compensation and the impact of over- and under-compensation’ (p. 313).  The above 
viewpoint is shared by other researchers (e.g., Jin and He, 2013; McQuilken et al., 2013).  
Attempting to answer the above calls for research, this study examines the impact of 
overcompensation rendered by guarantee payout on customer perceptions of distributive 
justice, at the recovery stage.  Consistent with the equity theory, the study posits that 
guarantee payout in the form of full refund (i.e. medium payout) will be perceived as just, 
more than a guarantee payout that overcompensates customers by including full refund plus 
discount (i.e. high payout). Thus, it is hypothesised that:  
H1b When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers who 
receive high guarantee payout will show lower perceptions of distributive justice than 
customers who receive low or medium guarantee payout. 
 
2.4 Ease of invocation  
EoI entails the complexity of the process of invoking the guarantee payout.  Perceived 
complexity of the invocation process relates to the amount of effort put by the customer in 
order to invoke the guarantee (Wirtz and Kum, 2004).  The policy invocation process is 
considered to be ‘easy’ when no questions are asked, or ‘difficult’ when the customer needs 
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to submit a written claim, provide a proof of purchase, wait for notification, and sometimes 
physically return to the firm’s premises to collect the payout (Jin and He, 2013).  Hart (1988) 
suggests that service guarantees are effective when easy-to-invoke.  The author argues that a 
guarantee containing several conditions that make it difficult for customers to invoke ‘loses 
its point’ (p. 56).  Difficult-to-invoke guarantees can exacerbate customer dissatisfaction 
following service failures.  
Beyond the above suggestions, EoI has so far received relatively little research 
attention.  Exceptions are the studies by Jin and He (2013) showing that easy-to-invoke 
guarantees have a greater positive influence on customer decisions than difficult-to-invoke 
guarantees, and Meyer et al. (2014) demonstrating that service guarantees increase the firm’s 
market value when including straightforward invocation processes.  Notwithstanding, 
research that addresses the role of EoI in signaling the firm’s quality of fairness in a recovery 
context is currently lacking.  The above scarcity of empirical research is surprising given that 
service guarantees are invoked when services fail, and thus function as recovery strategies.  
When service guarantees function as recovery strategies, EoI is likely to influence the 
perceived timeliness of the recovery process.  Given that timeliness is a key principle of 
procedural justice (e.g., Chebat and Slusarczyk, 2005), EoI is expected to impact customer 
perceptions of procedural justice. 
When service guarantees are difficult-to-invoke, the customer may need to go through 
a complex process of filling up forms and providing evidence of the service failure 
encountered.  Difficult-to-invoke guarantees can, therefore, lengthen the recovery process 
and delay the delivery of payout.  As a result, customers are expected to perceive the 
timeliness of recovery to be low, and thus report low procedural justice perceptions.  
Conversely, easy-to-invoke guarantees enable a quick collection of payout and timely 
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recovery.  Accordingly, easy-to-invoke guarantees are expected to foster high perceptions of 
procedural justice.  Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H2a,b  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers dealing 
with an easy or moderately easy-to-invoke guarantee will show higher perceptions of 
procedural justice than customers who deal with a difficult-to-invoke guarantee.  
 
2.5 The interaction effect of guarantee payout and ease of invocation 
Extant signaling research suggests that the effects of payout and EoI can be 
interdependent.  For instance, Wirtz and Kum (2004) show that customers report lower 
intentions to cheat on the guarantee by faking dissatisfaction when this policy includes high 
payout and it is easy-to-invoke, rather than difficult-to-invoke.  These authors attribute the 
finding to customer willingness to show honesty in return for the trust signaled by the firm by 
offering an easy-to-invoke guarantee, including high payout.  Further, when the timeframe of 
customer purchase decisions is considered, Jin and He (2013) show that easy-to-invoke 
guarantees combined with high payout encourage imminent purchase decisions.  
Whilst the above studies examine the interplay between payout and EoI in influencing 
customer cheating and purchase intentions, the simultaneous impact of the two guarantee 
terms on customer perceptions of recovery fairness and related repatronage intentions is 
undetermined.  The present study postulates an interaction effect between payout and EoI in 
shaping customer perceptions of justice.  From a signaling perspective, guarantee payout and 
EoI signal the firm’s fairness in handling service failures and thus influence customer 
perceptions of justice.  Customers are likely to perceive added benefits from the recovery 
encounter when receiving payout in the form of full refund plus discount, and the processes 
of invoking the guarantee are easy.  Such added benefits are likely to lead to high distributive 
justice perceptions.  Given that distributive justice perceptions are obtained when perceived 
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benefits of an exchange are greater than incurred sacrifices (Adams, 1965), easy processes of 
invoking the guarantee combined with payout in the form of full refund plus discount are 
expected to enhance distributive justice perceptions.  Thus, it is postulated that: 
H3a  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers who 
receive high payout as part of an easy-to-invoke guarantee will show higher 
perceptions of distributive justice than customers who receive low payout as part of a 
difficult-to-invoke guarantee. 
 
Further, when easy-to-invoke guarantees are combined with full refund and discount, 
the process of invoking the guarantee is likely to be perceived as seamless and worth the 
effort, due to the substantial monetary benefit.  As a result, perceptions of procedural justice 
are expected to be enhanced accordingly.  Thus, it is postulated that:  
H3b  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers who 
receive high payout as part of an easy-to-invoke guarantee will show higher 
perceptions of procedural justice than customers who receive low payout as part of a 
difficult-to-invoke guarantee.  
 
2.6 The role of negative motive inferences 
Prior research suggests that signals are typically used to convey information about the 
intentions and unobservable qualities of the firm (e.g., Kirmani and Rao, 2000; San Martín 
and Camarero, 2005).  When evaluating signals, customers thus form perceptions of the 
firm’s qualities and infer the firm’s intentions.  Several scholars have noted the relevance of 
inferences about the firm’s intentions in explaining customer perceptions of fairness.  In the 
context of price guarantees, for instance, customer inferences about the firm’s 
intentions/motivations for offering the policy are found to influence the impact of payout set 
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in the guarantee on customer perceptions of price fairness (Kukar-Kinney et al., 2007).  
Further, Björlin-Lidén and Edvardsson (2003) note the relevance of such inferences in the 
context of service guarantees.  In their study, findings from focus groups reveal that 
consumers are suspicious of guarantees, which are perceived to meet the firm’s need to create 
a steady flow of customers.  Similarly, McQuilken et al. (2013) speculate that the level of 
payout, whether higher or lower to the level set in the guarantee, raises suspicion about the 
intentions of the firm.   
The above indicates that the way guarantees are designed can trigger customer 
inferences about the firm’s motivations for offering these policies, either positive (customer-
oriented) or negative (firm-oriented). Inferences of motives are theoretically grounded in the 
Attribution Theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986), wherein attribution is the process of 
establishing the causes of events, especially surprising or negative events.  These causes are 
often not directly observable, causality thus represents an ascription imposed by the 
individual, which is either inferred or speculated (Weiner, 1986). 
Service recovery research has so far focused on understanding customer responses to 
service failures through the lens of locus, stability and controllability attributions (e.g., 
Blodgett et al., 1993; Hess et al., 2003; Swanson and Kelley, 2001), whilst overlooking 
attributions of motive.  An exception is Joireman et al. (2013) who examine how inferences 
of motives impact customer anger and related desires for revenge and/or reconciliation.  
Joireman et al. (2013) examine inferences of the firm’s motives following ‘double deviation’ 
scenarios, wherein both the initial service and the recovery fail.  However, in the above study, 
inferred motive is not examined in relation to one-off service failures.  Additionally, 
Joireman et al. (2013) do not consider customer perceptions of justice. 
This study examines how differential levels of service guarantee terms impact 
customer inferences of the firm’s motives, and how such inferences influence perceptions of 
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justice in one-off service failure and recovery encounters.  The hypothesised impact of 
guarantee terms on customer inferences of motives finds theoretical explanation in the 
signaling theory (Spence, 1973, 1974).  Consistent with signaling theory, the size of 
guarantee payout indicates the firm’s commitment to incur a cost as a result of a service 
failure (e.g., Hart et al., 1992; McDougall et al., 1998; San Martín and Camarero, 2005).  In 
this regard, greater the size of guarantee payout, higher is the signaled commitment of the 
firm towards the cost of compensating the customer fairly.  Customers are expected to be less 
likely to attribute guarantee payout in the form of full refund or refund plus discount to the 
firm’s negative motives of increasing profits.  Conversely, payout in the form of a discount 
signals the firm’s commitment of incurring a low cost following the service failure, and it 
shows that the firm’s commitment to fairness is low as well.  Customers are, therefore, likely 
to infer negative firm motives (i.e. to increase profits) for offering guarantee payout in the 
form of a discount.  Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H4a,b  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers who 
receive high or medium guarantee payout will show lower inferences of firm’s 
negative motives than customers who receive low guarantee payout.  
 
Signaling research also suggests that guarantees are meaningful when easy-to-invoke 
(Hart, 1988).  By setting easy procedures of invocation, the firm signals its commitment 
towards delivering timely recovery and its trust that customers will avoid opportunistic 
claiming of the guarantee (Wirtz and Kum, 2004).  Conversely, difficult-to-invoke guarantees 
signal the firm’s attempt to discourage customers from claiming this policy (Wirtz and Kum, 
2004).  Hence, when a guarantee policy is difficult-to-invoke, customers are expected to infer 
the firm’s negative motive of increasing profits.  Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
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H5a,b When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customers dealing 
with an easy or moderately easy-to-invoke guarantee will show lower inferences of 
firm’s negative motives than customers who deal with a difficult-to-invoke guarantee. 
 
Furthermore, inferences of the firm’s motive for offering the guarantee are expected 
to influence customer perceptions of recovery fairness.  Examining perceptions towards price 
fairness, Campbell (1999) demonstrates that perceived price fairness lowers as customers 
attribute price increases to negative motives of the firm.  The present study posits that 
inferences of negative motive will diminish perceptions of distributive justice towards the 
guarantee.  When negative motives are inferred, customers are expected to question the 
firm’s commitment towards delivering distributive justice and towards protecting customers 
against future losses in the event service failures re-occur.  Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H6a  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customer 
inferences of firm’s negative motives will have a negative influence on perceptions of 
distributive justice.  
 
Additionally, inferences of negative motives are expected to diminish perceptions of 
procedural justice.  When the firm is believed to offer the guarantee in order to meet its own 
interests of increasing profits, customers are expected to question the firm’s commitment 
towards rendering procedural justice and towards providing timely recovery in the event 
service failures re-occur.  Hence, it is hypothesised that: 
H6b When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customer 
inferences of firm’s negative motives will have a negative influence on perceptions of 
procedural justice.  
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2.7  The impact of perceived justice towards the guarantee on repatronage intentions 
The impact of perceived justice on customer repatronage intentions is well 
documented in the extant service recovery literature (e.g., Blodgett et al., 1993; Choi and 
Choi, 2014; Homburg and Fürst, 2005).  Overall, the studies explain the above impact as the 
result of, a) a direct relationship (e.g., Blodgett et al., 1993), or b) an indirect relationship 
through the mediation of customer satisfaction (e.g., Maxham and Netemeyer, 2002).  
However, prior studies have examined perceived justice following employee-initiated 
recovery efforts, rather than perceived justice related to service recovery implemented 
through service guarantees.  The present study hypothesises a direct relationship between 
perceived justice (both distributive and procedural) rendered by the service guarantee, and 
repatronage intentions.   
The above hypothesis is theoretically explained by the reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 
1960), suggesting that individuals are inclined to help those who have helped them.  In this 
regard, studies have shown that perceived fairness generates feelings of reciprocity (e.g., 
Grégoire et al., 2009; Van Vaerenbergh et al., 2012).  For instance, Grégoire et al. (2009) 
note that customers holding a good relationship with the firm reciprocate fair recovery by 
showing lower intentions to take revenge.  In a similar way, the present study postulates that 
customers will reciprocate distributive and procedural fairness rendered through the 
guarantee by showing repatronage intentions.  Hence:  
H7a  When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customer 
perceptions of distributive justice will have a positive influence on repatronage 
intentions. 
H7b When service recovery is implemented through a service guarantee, customer 
perceptions of procedural justice will have a positive influence on repatronage 
intentions. 
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3. Methodology  
3.1 Design and participants 
In order to address the study’s objectives, a scenario-based experimental approach 
was employed.  This approach has been widely used in service research (e.g., Chebat and 
Slusarczyk, 2005; Zhu et al., 2013).  Scenario-based experiments are a cost-effective method 
for measuring customer perceptions towards naturally occurring events such as service failure 
and recovery.  Further, scenario-based experiments overcome issues of recall bias associated 
with self-reporting techniques, and assist with the control of manipulations (Smith et al., 
1999). 
The experiment followed a 3×3 between-subjects factorial design, leading to nine 
experimental conditions.  The experiment included two factors, which were manipulated at 
three levels: guarantee payout (high/medium/low) and EoI (high/medium/low).  The 
‘medium’ condition designated the promise signaled by the guarantee, whereas ‘high’ and 
‘low’ conditions referred to more, or less, than what was signaled by the guarantee.  Payout 
was operationalised by manipulating the generosity of compensation provided at the recovery 
stage, following the invocation of the guarantee: full refund plus 25% discount (high payout), 
full refund (medium payout), and 10% discount (low payout).  EoI was operationalised by 
manipulating the complexity of the policy invocation process: filling in an online claim form 
(high EoI), filling in a claim form and emailing it to the Customer Relations Team (medium 
EoI), and filling in a claim form detailing what went wrong, along with a proof of purchase, 
mailing it to the Customer Relations Team and waiting for a validity check of the claim (low 
EoI).  A summary of the experimental conditions is provided in Appendix 2. 
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The scenarios were designed in two stages: 1) secondary research was conducted in 
order to identify the features of service guarantees offered in the marketplace, and 2) relevant 
features were incorporated in the scenarios and two pre-tests were conducted.  Parcel delivery 
service was selected as service context for three main reasons.  First, the demand for parcel 
delivery services is currently increasing due to the growth of online retailing, and in the UK 
the sector is expected to grow rapidly and reach a projected value of £19bn by 2017 
(KeyNote, 2013).  Consumers are familiar with this type of service and they can easily 
imagine themselves in the scenarios created for the study.  Second, this sector frequently 
experiences service failures (e.g., delays in parcel deliveries during festive seasons, KeyNote, 
2013).  Results from the pre-tests confirmed that most respondents encountered failures with 
delivery services in the past.  Third, secondary research revealed that parcel delivery 
companies frequently employ service guarantee policies. 
Consistent with a between-subjects design, respondents were randomly assigned to 
one of the nine experimental conditions.  Respondents included a sample of UK consumers 
selected by means of snowball sampling technique.  The average sample size for the nine 
experimental conditions was 15 respondents.  Altogether 139 valid responses were obtained, 
giving a response rate of 62 per cent.  The sample included 57 per cent females, 43 per cent 
males, 64 per cent below 34 years, 21 per cent in the 35-44 age group, and 15 per cent over 
45 years.  The majority of respondents reported using parcel delivery service three or more 
times a year (63 per cent), followed by those who used this service twice (12 per cent) or 
once a year (25 per cent). 
 
3.2 Procedure  
The data were collected using a self-completion questionnaire embedding scenarios of 
service failure and recovery.  The questionnaire was designed and administered online, via 
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the electronic survey building software Qualtrics.  Respondents were sent a URL link 
directing them to the questionnaire.  At the beginning of the questionnaire, the respondents 
were asked general questions about their residence, their usage and past experience using 
parcel delivery services.  Next, the respondents were asked to imagine that they had 
purchased a guaranteed next day parcel delivery service from a fictitious company called 
ABC Express.  The guaranteed next day delivery service was advertised on the company’s 
website, where they made the purchase (see Appendix 3).  The respondents were asked to 
imagine that they had experienced a late parcel delivery (service failure) and lodged a 
complaint.  In the recovery encounter, respondents imagined they had invoked the guarantee.  
After reading the recovery scenario, respondents answered a battery of closed-ended 
questions regarding their perceptions of justice, inferences of motive, and repatronage 
intentions.  The realism of service failure and recovery scenarios and the validity of the 
experimental manipulations were checked, as recommended by Perdue and Summers (1986). 
 
3.3 Measures 
Established multi-item scales were adopted and contextualised for the study.  Eight 
items from Maxham and Netemeyer (2002) to measure distributive justice and procedural 
justice, three items from Kukar-Kinney et al. (2007) to measure inferred motive, and two 
items from Schoefer and Diamantopoulos (2008) to measure repatronage intentions, all on a 
7-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree, were 
adopted.  Three realism check items from Sparks and McColl-Kennedy (2001) were 
borrowed.  Two bipolar items from Wirtz and Kum (2004) were used as manipulation check 
measures for payout and EoI.  Age, gender and failure severity were included as covariates, 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Zhu et al., 2013).  The measures used in this study are 
presented in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1 Measures  
Constructs Measurement items 
Distributive 
Justice 
 Although the late delivery caused me problems, the effort 
put by ABC Express resulted in a positive outcome for me. 
 The compensation received as part of the guarantee was fair, 
given the time and effort spent in lodging a complaint. 
 Given the inconvenience caused by the late delivery, the 
compensation received from ABC Express’ guarantee was 
fair. 
 Overall, the guarantee compensation I received in response 
to the late delivery was more than fair. 
Procedural 
Justice 
 Following the late delivery, the guarantee invocation 
resulted in a quick response from ABC Express. 
 I feel ABC Express responded in a timely fashion to the late 
delivery. 
 With respect to the guarantee policy advertised on its 
website, ABC Express handled my late delivery in a fair 
manner. 
 Overall ABC Express has a fair guarantee policy to handle 
late parcel deliveries. 
Inferred Motive  ABC Express is serving its own interests by offering the 
advertised guarantee. 
 ABC Express offers the advertised guarantee to increase its 
profits at the expense of customers. 
 ABC Express intends to take advantage of customers by 
offering the advertised guarantee. 
Repatronage 
Intentions 
 I would consider using the delivery service of ABC Express 
in the future. 
 I will use ABC Express if I need to buy parcel delivery 
services again. 
    Note: All items were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1=‘strongly disagree’ and 
7=‘strongly agree’ 
 
 
3.4 Realism and manipulation checks 
Two pre-tests were conducted (n=45).  The main objective of the pre-tests was to 
establish the realism of the scenarios and that the experimental manipulations worked as 
intended.  Realism checks were conducted by asking respondents the extent to which they 
thought the situation depicted in the scenario could happen in real life, and whether they 
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could imagine themselves as the customer.  Both the service failure and the recovery 
scenarios were perceived as realistic, with mean ratings greater than 5 on a 7-point scale 
(failure M=5.76, SD=1.25; recovery M=5.58, SD=1.06).  Thus, the ecological validity of the 
study was confirmed. 
Manipulation checks for payout were conducted by asking respondents to indicate the 
generosity of guarantee payout received at the recovery stage.  Respondents perceived the 
generosity of guarantee payout in the form of discount only to be significantly lower than 
refund or refund plus discount F(2, 138)=36.712, p<.05.  Manipulation checks for EoI were 
conducted by asking respondents to indicate the complexity of the policy invocation process.  
Respondents perceived the invocation process to be significantly more complex when asked 
to complete a claim form, mail it to the Customer Relations Team and wait for a validity 
check of the claim, as compared to when asked to fill in a claim form and mail it to the 
Customer Relations Team, or fill in an online form F(2, 138)=4.999, p<.05.  In sum, the 
manipulation check results supported the effectiveness of the manipulations of payout and 
EoI. 
 
3.5 Analysis and results 
In order to test the research hypotheses, Partial Least Squares Structural Equation 
Modeling (PLS-SEM) analysis was conducted using SmartPLS 3.0 software (Ringle et al., 
2014).  Unlike MANOVA, structural equation analysis of experimental data allows for a 
complete modeling of theoretical relations, and for testing of the measurement and structural 
models simultaneously, thereby accounting for measurement error (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989).  
In addition, the PLS approach to structural equation analysis is preferred over covariance-
based approaches when assumptions of multivariate normality are violated and the sample 
size is small (e.g., Bagozzi et al., 1991; Chin, 2010; Hair et al., 2014).  A dummy variable 
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approach was followed, as recommended by Bagozzi and Yi (1989).  Dummy variables were 
created for the experimental manipulations of payout and EoI (coded as 0,1, with the ‘low’ 
manipulation representing the reference level).  The dummy variables functioned as single-
item constructs and the paths from the dummy variables to the latent (multi-item) dependent 
variable reflected the difference in the means of the latent (multi-item) construct.    
For hypotheses testing, PLS-SEM typically follows a two-step approach. First, the 
measurement model is assessed, and second the structural model is examined (Hair et al., 
2014).  Given the reflective constructs in the model, the measures were inspected for internal 
consistency reliability, as well as for convergent and discriminant validity.  Results from the 
measurement model assessment are summarised in Table 2 below.  
Table 2 Reliability and validity measures 
 Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Composite 
Reliability (Pc) 
Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 
Distributive Justice 0.943 0.959 0.855 
Procedural Justice 0.927 0.948 0.821 
Inferred Motive 0.861 0.935 0.877 
Repatronage 0.906 0.955 0.914 
 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability estimates were above the recommended 
thresholds of 0.7, thus confirming the internal consistency reliability of the scales (Henseler 
et al., 2009).  The loadings of the single items on the corresponding construct were well 
above the acceptable cut-off point of 0.7, with the exception of one item for inferred motive 
(loading below 0.3).  After the removal of this item (following Hair et al., 2014; Joireman et 
al., 2013), all items showed loadings greater than 0.7, thus item reliability was confirmed.  
Further, all constructs showed Average Variance Extracted (AVE) estimates exceeding the 
threshold of 0.5, thus confirming convergent validity (Chin, 1998).  Finally, discriminant 
validity was established by using Fornell and Larcker’s criterion (1981); the squared 
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correlations of a construct’s AVE (values in boldface on the diagonal line of Table 3) were 
higher than their bivariate correlations with other constructs. 
Table 3 Discriminant validity  
  DJ Inferred 
Motive 
PJ Repatronage 
DJ 0.925 
   Inferred Motive -0.166 0.937 
  PJ 0.822 -0.245 0.906 
 Repatronage 0.555 -0.125 0.500 0.956 
   Note: DJ=Distributive Justice; PJ= Procedural Justice 
For structural model assessment, the variance explained for the constructs (R-square), 
the model’s predictive relevance (Stone-Geisser’s Q-square), effect size (f2), the size and 
significance of the paths were examined.  The results from the structural model assessment 
are summarised in Table 4 below.  The proposed model showed high predictive accuracy for 
distributive justice (R
2
=0.45), and moderate to weak predictive accuracy for repatronage 
intentions (R
2
=0.31) and procedural justice (R
2
=0.06).  All Q
2
 values were positive, thus 
indicating high predictive validity of the overall model (Hair et al., 2014).  
Table 4 Structural model results and effect sizes 
Hyp. Criterion Predictors R
2
 Path 
coefficients 
f
2
 Q
2
 
H1b Distributive Justice High payout 0.445 0.672*** 0.02 0.370 
H1a  Medium payout  0.659***   
H3a  Payout*EoI  0.223   
H6a  Inferred Motive  0.014   
H2a Procedural Justice  High EoI 0.060 0.003 0.10 0.038 
H2b  Medium EoI  0.005   
H3b  Payout*EoI  0.461   
H6b  Inferred Motive  -0.254***   
H4a Inferred Motive High payout 0.094 -0.208**  0.066 
H4b  Medium payout  -0.348***   
H5a  High EoI  -0.008   
H5b  Medium EoI  0.059   
H7a Repatronage Distributive Justice 0.314 0.446***  0.272 
H7b  Procedural Justice  0.136   
  Note: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; EoI=Ease of Invocation 
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To estimate the structural paths, a bootstrap resampling procedure using 5,000 sub-
samples was followed (Hair et al., 2014).  The results showed that payout in the form of full 
refund, as set in the guarantee, is perceived to be fair and leads to distributive justice 
perceptions (path coefficient=0.672, t=9.10).  Guarantee payout including full refund plus 
discount is also perceived as being fairer than receiving 10% discount, yet not more than 
refund alone (path coefficient=0.659, t=10.09).  Hence, H1 is supported.  As hypothesised, 
consumers report equal perceptions of distributive justice when receiving guarantee payout in 
the form of full refund, or full refund plus discount.  Yet, distributive justice decreases 
sharply when only 10% discount is received.  By contrast, easy or moderately easy-to-invoke 
guarantees do not lead to greater perceptions of procedural justice, than difficult-to-invoke 
guarantees (path coefficients=0.003-0.005, t=0.006-0.046).  Hence, H2 is not supported. 
Results from the product indicator approach for testing interaction effects revealed 
that the payout x EoI path is not significantly related to distributive justice (path 
coefficient=0.223, t=0.81) or to procedural justice (path coefficient=0.461, t=1.42).  
Therefore, H3 is not supported.   Interestingly, the payout x EoI path is significant in 
predicting distributive justice when the guarantee is easy-to-invoke, and it includes full 
refund rather than full refund plus discount (path coefficient=0.507, t=1.92).  Similarly, the 
payout x EoI path is significant in predicting procedural justice when the guarantee includes 
full refund and it is only moderately easy-to-invoke (path coefficient=-0.525, t=1.68).  
Although not formally hypothesised, results from these interaction effects are relevant and 
reveal that the effect of payout in the form of full refund, rather than full refund plus 
discount, on distributive justice is contingent upon the ease of invoking the guarantee.  
Further, moderately easy-to-invoke guarantees are indeed perceived to be fair when 
combined with a very large payout in the form of full refund plus discount.  The inclusion of 
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the interaction terms to the model yielded a significant, small effect in explaining distributive 
justice (f
2
=0.02) and a significant, medium effect in explaining procedural justice (f
2
=0.10). 
Further, results reveal that consumers make lower inference of negative motive when 
receiving guarantee payout in the form of full refund plus discount (path coefficient=-0.208, 
t=2.14) or full refund (path coefficient=-0.348, t=3.82), as compared to payout in the form of 
a discount (p<.05).  In contrast, easy or moderately easy-to-invoke guarantees do not lower 
inferences of negative motive when compared with difficult-to-invoke guarantees (p>.05).  
Therefore, H4 is supported, but H5 is not.  Inferences of negative motive lower perceptions of 
procedural justice (path coefficient=-0.254, t=2.64), but not perceptions of distributive justice 
(path coefficient=0.014, t=0.29).  In turn, distributive justice encourages repatronage 
intentions (path coefficient=0.446, t=3.72), whereas procedural justice does not (path 
coefficient=0.136, t=1.04).  Hence, H6 and H7 are partially supported.  The paths and the 
results are depicted in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1: PLS Path Model Results 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Understanding customer perceptions of service guarantees employed as recovery 
strategies represents a critical issue for service managers in order to design effective policies.  
When service failures occur, service guarantee policies function as recovery strategies and 
determine the firm’s service recovery efforts.  Specifically, the terms set in the guarantee 
influence the monetary compensation that the customers receive at the recovery stage (i.e. 
payout) and the processes of claiming such compensation (i.e. ease of invocation).  Through 
the guarantee terms, the firm signals justice and its motivations for offering the policy.  The 
present study examined the impact of two guarantee terms, namely payout and EoI, on 
customer perceptions of justice, inferences of the firm’s motives, and consequent repatronage 
intentions.  
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This study confirmed that perceptions of fairness towards guarantees employed as 
recovery strategies vary according to the level of guarantee payout.  Customers show greater 
perceptions of distributive justice when receiving payout in the form of full refund, rather 
than 10% discount on the next purchase.  Hence, providing a payout in the form of 10% 
discount is not perceived as fair recovery.  The benefits associated with guarantee payout in 
the form of a discount do not outweigh perceived sacrifices related to the inconvenience 
caused by the service failure and the process of lodging a complaint.  As a result, customers 
show low perceptions of distributive justice.  On the contrary, customers perceive a double 
loss from the service failure and payout of 10% discount.  The above finding is consistent 
with prior signaling literature suggesting that the perceived credibility and fairness of 
guarantee signals increase with the size of payout (e.g., Kukar-Kinney et al., 2007).  Whilst 
high guarantee payout signals the firm’s commitment towards incurring a large cost 
following service failures (Hart et al., 1992), and towards issues of fairness, payout in the 
form of a discount signals that the firm lacks commitment towards issues of fairness in 
delivering service recovery . 
Remarkably, there is no extra enhancement of distributive justice perceptions when 
guarantee payout in the form of a full refund plus discount is provided, as compared to 
payout in the form of full refund.  The above finding indicates that whilst overcompensation 
(i.e. full refund plus discount) provided through the guarantee enhances distributive justice, 
the above effect is not greater than the effect of compensation alone (i.e. full refund).  The 
above finding is in line with the equity theory suggesting that overcompensation leads to 
positive inequity and feelings of guilt and embarassment (Adams, 1965).  Customers perceive 
a payout which is larger than the level set in the guarantee as undeserved, and experience 
related feelings of guilt .   
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Additionally, the above finding provides support for the contention by Gelbrich and 
Roschk (2011) that following service failures, customers are concerned about receiving 
compensation that reduces the losses incurred, more than compensation that maximises gains.  
The level of overcompensation set in the experimental scenarios included in the present study 
may also explain the finding.  In particular, the specificity of the information in the medium 
payout condition, wherein payout is in the form of full refund, could have led respondents to 
perceive full refund as more salient in reducing the losses encountered, than information 
about overcompensation.  As a result, overcompensation delivered through the guarantee 
does not lead enhancements in distributive justice perceptions.  
By contrast, the process of invoking the guarantee, whether highly or only slightly 
complicated, does not lead to perceptions of procedural justice.  This finding diverges from 
the contention by Hart (1988) that guarantees are most effective when easy-to-invoke.  When 
a service guarantee is employed as a recovery strategy, the ease of invoking the guarantee 
does not lead to positive perceptions of justice.  The above finding means that the ease of 
guarantee invocation process is not essential for effective service recovery management.  An 
explanation for this finding is that customers are generally accustomed to lengthy processes 
of claiming guarantee policies.  Their level of acceptance of lengthy invocation processes is 
high, and their perceptions of procedural justice, therefore, do not enhance when guarantees 
are very easy-to-invoke.  
It is noteworthy that when guarantee payout and EoI are examined in combination, 
their interaction does not lead to significant changes in customer perceptions of distributive 
and procedural justice.  This result, at first, suggests that guarantee payout and EoI have an 
independent effect on perceived justice.  Yet, an inspection of the interaction between payout 
as full refund and moderately easy processes of invoking the guarantee offers interesting 
insights.  The interaction effects between full refund and easy invocation processes, and 
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between full refund plus discount and moderately easy invocation processes, are indeed 
significant.  The above findings suggest that the effect of full refund, as set in the guarantee, 
in enhancing perceptions of distributive justice is contingent upon the ease of invoking the 
guarantee.  Similarly, the effect of moderately easy-to-invoke guarantees in enhancing 
perceptions of procedural justice is contingent upon the provision of substantial payout, 
including full refund plus discount.   
The above reported lack of interaction effect between payout in the form of full 
refund plus discount and easy invocation processes does not support the findings by Wirtz 
and Kum (2004) who show that, in reference to customer cheating intentions, guarantees that 
include substantial payout and easy invocation processes work best at preventing customer 
cheating behaviour.  This divergence of findings could be attributed to the context in which 
the guarantee is invoked following a service failure.  When experiencing a service failure, 
customers perceive guarantee payout to be fair if the process of invoking the guarantee is 
easy and it leads to timely resolution of the problem, though no additional redress for the 
inconvenience is offered.  By contrast, recovery processes are perceived to be fair if the 
guarantee invocation process is complicated, but it results in substantial monetary benefit.  
Another important finding of this study is that the inferences of negative motive vary 
according to the levels of guarantee payout.  This finding follows the signaling perspective 
suggesting that the size of guarantee payout signals the firm’s commitment to incur costs due 
to the service failure (e.g., San Martín and Camarero, 2005).  The study’s findings reveal that 
customers report greater inferences of firm negative motives when receiving a 10% discount 
as guarantee payout, as compared to full refund or refund plus discount.  The provision of 
10% discount thus signals low firm commitment to delivering fairness and is attributed to the 
firm’s motive to pursue its own interests of profits.  Conversely, the provision of full refund 
or full refund plus discount signals the firm’s commitment towards delivering fairness.  Such 
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guarantee payout is associated with the firm’s motives to serve customer interests (i.e. to 
prevent customer losses).  
In support of the contention that inferences of motive influence perceptions of justice, 
the study’s findings show that inferences of negative motives lower perceptions of procedural 
justice.  The above finding is consistent with the evidence on price fairness (Campbell, 1999) 
and price guarantees (Kukar-Kinney et al., 2007) showing that customer perceptions of price 
fairness diminish when price increases are attributed to the firm’s self-serving motives.  
Similarly, in situations where service recovery is implemented through service guarantees, 
customers’ perceptions of procedural justice diminish when the firm is believed to be serving 
its interests of increasing profits through the offering of a service guarantee. 
Inferences of motive, however, do not diminish distributive justice perceptions.  In 
spite of inferences that the firm uses the guarantee in order to meet its own interests of 
profits, customers perceive the benefits resulting from the recovery encounter to outweigh the 
sacrifices undergone as a result of experiencing a service failure and of lodging a complaint.  
Accordingly, distributive justice perceptions remain unchanged, yet foster repatronage 
intentions.  Consistent with prior research (e.g., Grégoire et al., 2009), fairness rendered 
through guarantee payout generates feelings of reciprocity leading customers to show 
intentions to re-visit the firm.  By contrast, and as expected, procedural justice lowered by 
inferences of negative motives does not lead to repatronage intentions. 
 
5. Implications for theory and practice, limitations and further research 
The present study offers a novel frame for investigating how service guarantees 
function in a recovery context.  Specifically, the study focuses on understanding how service 
guarantee terms signal the firm’s justice in handling service failures and the underlying 
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motivations for offering these policies, thus in turn shaping customer perceptions of justice 
and inferences of motive.  In doing so, the study makes several important theoretical 
contributions to service recovery research.  Firstly, this study, for the first time, demonstrates 
that service guarantee policies play an important role as recovery strategies, given that such 
policies influence customer perceptions of recovery fairness. 
Secondly, when service guarantees are used in a recovery context, the terms of payout 
and EoI not only signal the firm’s fairness in handling service failures, but also the firm’s 
underlying motivations for employing this policy.  This study is the first to investigate causal 
attributions related to service guarantees, when the policies are implemented as recovery 
strategies.  The findings demonstrate that inferences of motive hold theoretical relevance in 
explaining how customers evaluate service recovery implemented through service guarantees 
and how they form related perceptions of justice.  Thirdly, this study demonstrates the 
applications of the justice, signaling and attribution theories into the domain of service 
recovery research.  As evidenced in this study, customers’ psychological processes of 
evaluating service recovery encounters are complex.  The interface of multiple theories thus 
provides a useful framework in unravelling such complexities. 
Further, the study’s findings have notable implications for service management, 
especially with regards to the design of service guarantee policies.  Considering the effect of 
guarantee payout on perceived justice and inferences of negative motives, service managers 
are advised to pay particular attention towards setting guarantee payout levels.  The results in 
this study demonstrate that overcompensating the customer by offering a payout higher than 
the guarantee (i.e. full refund plus discount) is not a profitable strategy, given that 
overcompensation offered through the guarantee does not lead to enhanced justice 
perceptions, unless combined with moderately easy invocation processes.  Delivering on the 
promise set by the guarantee can, however, benefit businesses more than overcompensation.  
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Conversely, the provision of guarantee payout in the form of a discount can be detrimental 
for businesses, as customers perceive this practice to be the firm’s attempt to increase profits 
at their expense.  It follows that the design of service guarantee policies should be based on a 
priori assessment of, a) the likely impact of guarantee terms on customer inferences of 
motive, and b) the extent to which the firm can meet the financial commitment set in the 
guarantee, if the service fails.  Finally, the complexity of the policy invocation process is 
contingent upon the payout set in the guarantee.  Hence, service managers are recommended 
to align the policy invocation procedures with the size of payout. 
This study has some limitations that also provide avenues for further research.  First, 
the study could be replicated across other service contexts where service guarantees are 
frequently used.  Whilst the hospitality sector has received attention in extant research, the 
same does not apply to services with ‘credence’ attributes (e.g., legal or medical services).  
Signaling effects are particularly relevant to credence services.  As suggested by Walsh and 
Beatty (2007), credence attributes of services are notably difficult to discern before and even 
after consumption, thus consumers rely more on marketing signals when dealing with these 
services. 
Second, future research could investigate additional elements of service guarantees 
and their effects on customer perceptions of justice and inferences of motive.  For example, 
guarantee scope, whether unconditional or attribute-specific, can provide further insights on 
customer perceptions towards service guarantees, in a recovery context  (e.g., Jin and He, 
2013; Wirtz and Kum, 2001).  An interaction effect between guarantee scope, payout and EoI 
is likely to emerge.  Third, further research is recommended for examining contextual factors, 
such as firm reputation, that could moderate the effects of guarantee terms on perceived 
justice and inferences of motive, in a recovery context.  For instance, Björlin-Lidén and 
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Edvardsson (2003) argue that firm reputation influences the perceived credibility of 
unconditional and conditional guarantees. 
Fourth, future studies could consider other outcomes of motive inferences and 
perceived justice, such as the relational constructs of trust and commitment.  Marketing 
signals are found to influence customer trust in the firm by means of lowering perceived risk 
associated with the purchase decision (San Martín and Camarero, 2005).  Whether the above 
effects hold when customer repurchase decisions are considered following service failures 
warrants empirical investigation.  Fifth, this study takes a cross-sectional approach towards 
understanding how service guarantees signal justice in a recovery context.  By employing a 
longitudinal design, future research could examine signaling effects over time, thereby 
shedding light on how perceptions of justice change as customers become knowledgeable 
about the payout and EoI set in service guarantee policies. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Author(s) Key Findings Future Research 
Hart (1988)  A service guarantee should be; (1) unconditional, (2) easy to understand, (3) 
financially meaningful, (4) easy to invoke and (5) quick to collect payout.  
 Test the impact of payout size, ease of invocation, ease of understanding, and 
the number of guarantee conditions on consumers. 
Hart et al. (1992)  Unconditional guarantees are helpful to firms vulnerable to NWOM.  
 Guarantees reduce perceived risk. 
 Test; (1) how guarantees function for firms relying upon referrals; (2) how 
implicit and explicit guarantees are used concurrently. 
Kumar et al. 
(1997) 
 Time guarantee, if met, increases satisfaction at the end of a wait. If 
violated, time guarantee decreases satisfaction at the end of the wait. 
 Examine; (1) the impact of guarantee payout, over and under-compensation, (2) 
situations of multiple waiting experiences. 
McDougall et al. 
(1998) 
 Consumers prefer the specific guarantee to the unconditional one.  
 Consumers mention the importance of fair settlement such as money back.  
 Test; (1) how guarantees influence repurchase intentions, in other service 
contexts, (2) using methods that overcome issues of recall bias. 
Ostrom and 
Iacobucci (1998) 
 Service guarantee leads to satisfaction and perceptions of quality.  
 External quality information moderates the effect of the guarantee. 
 Test the impact of guarantee invocation and payout on post-purchase 
evaluations. 
Wirtz et al. (2000)  Explicit guarantee marginally improves quality perceptions and reduces 
perceived risk, for good quality providers more than for outstanding ones.  
 Consider post-purchase evaluations, when guarantees are invoked 
 Measure quality and risk perceptions as multiple-item constructs 
Kandampully and 
Butler (2001) 
 Guarantees influence satisfaction, trust and loyalty.   
 Prompt service recovery, through the implementation of a service guarantee, 
should enable firms to reduce NWOM. 
 Test; (1) the proposed model and (2) how service recovery is implemented 
through service guarantees. 
Wirtz and Kum 
(2001) 
 Combined guarantees lower perceived risk and expectations of service 
failures, more than attribute-specific guarantees. 
 Test the effect of combined guarantee post-purchase, when the guarantee is 
invoked, with the use of multi-item scales. 
Björlin-Lidén and 
Edvardsson 
(2003) 
 Customers expect clarity of terms and fairness of service guarantees.  
 Suspicion arises when guarantees are introduced to acquire new customers. 
 Test; (1) perceived fairness of service guarantees, (2) customer suspicion of 
guarantees and the impact on behavioural responses. 
Björlin-Lidén and 
Skalen (2003) 
 Guarantees influence employee recovery efforts.  
 Service recovery perceived as unfair when employees follow the guarantee.   
 Examine, (1) how recovery process is implemented through service guarantee, 
(2) perceptions of recovery when knowledgeable about the guarantee. 
McCollough and 
Gremler (2004) 
 Service guarantee signaling, differentiation and coproduction influence 
post-consumption satisfaction, but guarantee evaluations do not. 
 Test if the effects hold when; (1) the service fails and the guarantee is invoked, 
(2) in other service settings. 
Wirtz and Kum 
(2004) 
 Cheating on the guarantee lowers when intending to repatronize the firm, 
when satisfied with the service, and having high morality.  
 Potential material gain does not affect cheating behaviour. 
 Examine; (1) cultural differences in opportunistic behaviour, (2) whether 
inferences of the firm's motive influence opportunistic behaviour. 
Hogreve and 
Gremler (2009) 
 Review of research on guarantees from 1985 to 2008 highlights increasing 
interest in the impact of service guarantees on consumer behavior. 
 Test the impact of service guarantees on service performance, service recovery, 
and return on service guarantee investments. 
McQuilken and 
Robertson (2011) 
 Guarantees encourage complaining behaviour.  
 Failure severity interacts with active request from employee and guarantee 
type in influencing exit behaviour. 
 Examine the role of guarantee in a service recovery context. 
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Wu et al. (2012)  Money-back guarantees increase perceptions of quality and lower perceived 
risk more than non-money-back guarantees.  
 Unconditional guarantee are most effective for reputed hotels. 
 Test whether the effects hold at the post-consumption stage. 
Jin and He (2013)  Wording in the guarantee and timeframe of purchase decisions influence the 
effect of service guarantees on perceived quality and purchase intentions.   
 Investigate; (1) other forms of compensation, (2) whether the effects hold at the 
post-consumption stage. 
McQuilken et al. 
(2013) 
 Recovery compensation, fix and failure severity jointly influence 
customers’ perceptions of distributive justice when guarantee is offered. 
 Consider procedural justice when guarantee is invoked. 
 Examine how the size of compensation influences customer suspicion. 
Berman and 
Mathur (2014) 
 Service guarantees benefit firms by, signaling quality, setting performance 
standards, providing data on service failures and by regaining customers. 
 Test service guarantees in the context of risky services. 
Van Vaerenberg 
et al. (2014) 
 Customers are likely to invoke the guarantee after unsuccessful recovery. 
 Collectivist societies invoke the guarantee even after successful recovery. 
 Consider when the guarantee is implemented as service recovery. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Scenario 
Introduction 
You forgot your mum’s birthday.  When you remember, you decide to send her a parcel containing a gift for her.  You need to get the 
parcel delivered to your parents’ house.  You search online for a provider of parcel delivery services, which can deliver your parcel 
quickly.  While searching online, you come across a company called ABC Express.  On its website, ABC Express is promoting a 
Premium Next Day Delivery service with a money back guarantee, as shown in the advertisement below. 
After reading the advertisement, you decide to arrange for your parcel to be delivered by ABC Express, at the cost of £40.00.  The price 
is more expensive than you usually pay for parcel delivery, but you are ready to incur this cost, as you want a next day delivery. 
Service failure 
You decide to phone ABC Express to arrange for the delivery and confirm the time your parcel is scheduled to arrive at your parents' 
house.  When you call, the employee confirms that your parcel will be delivered the next working day between 9am and 1pm.  You are 
also told that you will be able to track the status of your delivery through an online tracking system. However, your parents do not 
receive the parcel by 1pm the next day.  Therefore you check the status of your delivery online. The online tracking system shows that 
your parcel is at the depot.  Now you are sure that the parcel has not been delivered and you call ABC Express customer service team to 
complain. 
High  Medium  Low  
Payout 
 
 
 
 
 
“As part of our guarantee, we will 
provide you with a refund of the 
delivery charges incurred and we will 
attempt to re-deliver the parcel as soon 
as possible, free of charge. In addition, 
we will offer you a 25% discount on 
your next purchase”. 
“As part of our guarantee, we will 
provide you with a refund of the 
delivery charges incurred and we will 
attempt to re-deliver the parcel as soon 
as possible, free of charge.” 
“We will try to re-deliver the parcel as soon as 
possible, free of charge. However, we cannot 
refund your delivery charges as we attempted to 
deliver the parcel the next day but the postcode 
could not be found. The parcel is now at our 
depot. We will offer you a 10% discount on your 
next purchase.” 
EoI 
“To claim the guarantee, no questions 
will be asked. You will need to fill in a 
short online claim form with your 
details within the next three working 
days.” 
“To claim the guarantee, you will need 
to fill in and email us a claim form 
within three working days. In the claim 
form, you will need to provide details of 
what went wrong.” 
“To claim the guarantee, you will need to fill in 
and mail a claim form within three working days 
from the scheduled delivery date. In the claim 
form, you will need to explain what went wrong, 
enclose a proof of purchase and mail the 
documentation to our Customer Relations Team, 
who will carry out a validity check of your claim. 
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